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is a difference in treatment between banks which request a rating and those which do 
not. Using a sample of Asian banks rated by Fitch Ratings, I find evidence that 
unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones after accounting for differences 
in financial and non-financial characteristics between banks. This downward bias does 
not seem to be explained by the “self-selection hypothesis”, which states that banks 
with more favourable private information self-select into the solicited group because 
they can obtain higher ratings by doing so. Rather, unsolicited ratings appear to be 
lower because they are only based on public information and, as a result, they tend to 
be more conservative than solicited ones. This is shown by testing the “public 
disclosure hypothesis”, which states that the difference in treatment between solicited 
and unsolicited ratings disappears when banks with an unsolicited rating release enough 
public information to compensate for the absence of private information. Overall, the 
findings of this study have important policy implications for the reform of the credit 
rating industry and for the Third Pillar of the New Basel Accord.    
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1  Introduction 
  
Several facts have recently drawn public attention to the work and functioning of 
credit rating agencies. First and foremost, their failure to predict the Asian crisis and a 
wave of corporate scandals such as Enron, WorldCom or Parmalat. Second, the potential 
procyclicality of their assessments and their increasing role in the regulatory mechanism 
of financial markets. Third, a number of issues related to the transparency and integrity 
of the rating process. Among those issues, the practice of unsolicited ratings has 
prompted controversy among issuers, credit rating agencies and regulators alike. 
Unsolicited ratings are formally defined as “ratings that credit rating agencies conduct 
without being formally engaged to do so by the issuer” (IOSCO, 2003). As such, and 
contrary to solicited ratings, unsolicited ratings do not imply the payment of a rating fee 
and do not involve any formal meetings between the credit rating agency and the entity 
being rated.
2 These meetings typically provide an opportunity for credit rating agencies 
to get an overview of a company’s activities and to obtain more information than what 
is disclosed in its published annual reports. Fight (2001) reports excerpts of a survey 
conducted by Cantwell & Company which indicate that more than 90% of companies 
release either selected or substantial non-public information to their rating agency during 
these meetings. 
The controversy surrounding unsolicited ratings stems from the fact that many 
issuers complain that these “unwanted” ratings tend to be lower, ceteris paribus, than 
ratings which are solicited and paid for. Obviously, this perceived downward bias may be 
due to the fact that issuers with more favourable private information request a rating or 
to the fact that credit rating agencies assign more conservative ratings in the absence of 
private information. However, this perceived bias could also indicate that credit rating 
agencies are guilty of strong arm tactics aiming at expanding their market share 
aggressively. Many issuers indeed believe that unsolicited ratings are used by credit 
rating agencies to blackmail them into paying for and participating in a rating process in 
the hope of obtaining a higher solicited rating. A recent example of such alleged abuses 
of power are the successive downgrades of Hannover Re, one of the world’s largest 
reinsurance companies, by Moody’s Investors Service Inc. (“Moody’s”). Hannover Re was 
                                                           
2 Golin (2001) insists that most credit rating agencies nevertheless attempt to invite the 
participation of the rated entity, either through submission of questionnaires, informal visits, or 
informal reviews of the draft report.   3
initially approached by Moody’s in 1998 to subscribe to its rating services, but declined 
the offer since it was already paying fees to Standard and Poor’s (“S&P”) and A.M. Best 
Company (“A.M.”) - a smaller credit rating agency - for this purpose. Despite being 
turned down, Moody’s decided to go ahead and rate Hannover Re at no charge. 
Although Moody’s initial unsolicited rating was Aa2, only one notch below that given by 
S&P, it was subsequently lowered to Aa3 (January 2001) and then A2 (November 2001). 
In March 2003, Moody’s further downgraded Hannover to junk status (Baa1), while both 
S&P and A.M. continued to give the insurance company a rating well above investment 
grade. Moody’s final downgrade sparked a 10% drop in the insurer’s stock and surprised 
many analysts given that there was no new information in the public domain justifying 
this. Hannover Re’s comments were that Moody’s decisions were “pure blackmail” and 
that company’s officials had being told on many occasions that if they paid for a rating, 
it “could have a positive impact” on the grade. Hannover Re further pointed out that, 
since S&P was already making headway in Germany and throughout Europe in rating 
the insurance business, Moody’s decision to assign an unsolicited credit rating probably 
represented a fast way to play catch-up (Wall Street Journal, 2004).  
  In spite of the huge controversy surrounding unsolicited ratings,
3 credit rating 
agencies strongly defend this practice. Their main arguments can be summarised as 
follows. First, unsolicited ratings should be seen as a service to investors and market 
participants who frequently make requests for coverage of institutions that are unwilling 
to undergo the rating process or pay the fee (Standard and Poor’s, 2003). Second, 
unsolicited ratings contribute to open up competition among credit rating agencies as 
they allow smaller agencies to compete with the “Big Three”: Moody’s, S&P and Fitch 
Ratings (“Fitch”). Some of these smaller agencies, well established by now, would have 
found it very difficult to start their business without initially issuing some unsolicited 
ratings (Dominion Bond Rating Service, 2001). Third, unsolicited ratings prevent firms 
from “rating shopping”, a practice whereby firms only request an additional rating when 
they expect an improvement on their existing rating (Moody’s, 2004). Finally, credit 
rating agencies do not issue higher solicited ratings to keep existing customers or lower 
unsolicited ratings to attract new customers as it would imply that they are willing to 
jeopardise their reputation in order to benefit from a temporary increase in revenues 
(Golin, 2001).  
                                                           
3 For a review of other alleged abuses of power, see Hill (2004).   4
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the use or abuse of unsolicited 
ratings by investigating whether there is a difference in treatment between Fitch’ 
solicited and unsolicited bank ratings and, if so, why. Using individual ratings of Asian 
banks, I find that Fitch assigns the same weight to rating determinants reflecting public 
information in the solicited and unsolicited groups. This result gives some credence to 
Fitch’s claim that the methodology for its unsolicited bank ratings is “nearly the same” 
as for its solicited bank ratings (Fitch, 2001). However, I also find that unsolicited bank 
ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones after controlling for rating determinants 
reflecting public information. The difference in treatment between both types of ratings 
is economically significant, as it represents between 0.8 and 1.2 notches on a 1 to 9 
rating scale. This result questions Fitch’s attitude to refuse any regulation of unsolicited 
ratings (cf. section 2.1).  
Several explanations are consistent with a systematic difference in treatment between 
solicited and unsolicited ratings. This paper tests two hypotheses put forward by credit 
rating agencies, investors and academics. The first one is the “self-selection hypothesis”. 
This hypothesis states that solicited ratings tend to be higher than unsolicited ones 
because they are the result of self-selection based on private information, i.e. issuers 
(here, banks) with more favourable private information request a rating since they can 
obtain a higher rating by disclosing their private information to the rating agency. Under 
the self-selection hypothesis, I expect issuers with more favourable private information to 
self-select into the solicited group. This hypothesis is tested using a treatment effect 
model and an endogenous switching regression model, which both extend the standard 
model of sample selection due to Heckman (1979). 
A rejection of the self-selection hypothesis would be consistent with two different 
interpretations: unsolicited ratings are lower in order to persuade issuers to pay for a 
higher solicited rating; alternatively, unsolicited ratings are lower because they are only 
based on public information and, as a result, they tend to be more conservative than 
solicited ones. The latter interpretation is supported by contract theory. An important 
result in this area, known as the “full-disclosure theorem”, states that issuers always 
disclose good information in equilibrium when private information can be certified once 
disclosed and three additional conditions hold (see Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). As a 
result, issuers who choose not to disclose private information (i.e. not to ask for a rating) 
inevitably reveal that they are of the bad type and credit rating agencies assume the 
worst by assigning lower unsolicited ratings.    5
A way to test that lower unsolicited ratings are due to the absence of private 
information consists in verifying the second hypothesis, which I call the “public 
disclosure hypothesis”. This hypothesis states that the difference in treatment between 
solicited and unsolicited ratings disappears when issuers with an unsolicited rating 
release enough public information to compensate for the absence of private information. 
In other words, issuers who choose not to request a rating and who disclose little public 
information receive a low unsolicited rating, since in this case the disclosure of additional 
private information via a contractual relationship would contribute to lower the credit 
rating agency’s uncertainty about their true quality. However, issuers who choose not to 
request a rating but who disclose extensive public information do not receive a low 
unsolicited rating, since in this case the extra value of private information is low and 
there is thus no reason for the credit rating agency to err on the side of caution.
4  
Testing the public disclosure hypothesis is of particular interest in the case of Fitch’s 
ratings since a former official of BankWatch
5 acknowledges that “It is true that 
unsolicited ratings are often more conservative than solicited ratings. The reason is not 
that agencies are attempting to punish companies that decline to pay for a rating, but 
that where there is doubt, the agencies will tend to err on the side of caution. 
Correspondingly, the more information provided to the agencies, the more transparent 
the disclosure process, the more comfort agency analysts will feel in giving the company 
the benefit of the doubt (...) In the same manner, where in the case of an unsolicited 
rating, the issuer has not been very forthcoming with information, or places the burden 
of extracting that information on the agency analyst, it is not surprising that the agency 
analyst will tend to err on the side of conservatism, and properly so. As a matter of 
practice, less disclosure tends to be associated with higher risk. In the context of risk 
assessment, disclosure is not only the means by which the assessment is performed, it is 
also arguably a positive credit consideration in itself” (Golin [2001], pp. 534-535). Many 
market participants also believe that the absence of private information combined with 
low public disclosure explains the downward bias in unsolicited ratings. For instance, the 
investment bank Merrill Lynch noted that the low unsolicited ratings assigned to four 
major Egyptian banks by Moody’s in 1997 were mainly due to “poor transparency of 
financial accounts” along with “lack of cooperation regarding non-public information” 
                                                           
4 Thus, the public disclosure hypothesis assumes some degree of substitutability between private 
and public information, which is not necessarily unrealistic.   
5 BankWatch is the credit rating agency which initiated the practice of unsolicited bank ratings in 
Asia prior to its absorption by Fitch (see section 3.1).   6
(Egypt State Information Service, 1997). The public disclosure hypothesis is tested via a 
bank disclosure index similar to the one used by Baumann and Nier (2003).  
The results of this paper do not support the self-selection hypothesis since I do not 
find that banks with more favourable private information self-select into the solicited 
group. Rather, the results appear to be consistent with the public disclosure hypothesis 
since I find that banks which do not request a rating, but which disclose extensive public 
information, do not receive a lower unsolicited rating. The latter finding is interesting 
because the marginal impact that public disclosure has on the relationship between 
soliciting a rating and the actual rating outcome is ambiguous in theory. The marginal 
effect of public disclosure may be positive if issuers who do not request a rating and who 
disclose extensive public information receive the benefit of the doubt (public disclosure 
hypothesis). However, public disclosure may also confirm negative perceptions or 
intuitions about issuers who choose not to be rated, hence its marginal impact may be 
negative. This study shows that the first effect dominates the second. 
  The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The background to unsolicited 
ratings and the relevant literature are reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 presents a brief 
history of Fitch’s unsolicited ratings as well as the sample used in this study. Section 4 
describes the econometric framework used in the analysis. Section 5 investigates whether 
there is a difference in treatment between Fitch’s solicited and unsolicited bank ratings 
and, if so, whether the self-selection hypothesis or the public disclosure hypothesis can 
account for it. The last section concludes and offers some relevant policy implications. 
 
 
2  Background to research and review of the literature  
 
  2.1   Background to research 
 
  Prior to the 1970s, credit rating agencies used to charge bondholders a fee for 
obtaining rating information and thereby provided unsolicited rather than solicited 
ratings. The shift from a business model that was subscription-fee based to one that 
charged issuers for the privilege of obtaining a rating occurred mainly because of the 
spread of low-cost photocopying and the desire of issuers to reassure investors of the 
quality of their issuances (White, 2001). However, in 1991, Moody’s reintroduced the 
practice of unsolicited ratings and other agencies quickly followed in the mid-1990s.    7
Even though the vast majority of credit ratings are still assigned on a solicited basis, 
unsolicited credit ratings currently represent a sizeable portion of the total number of 
ratings. According to the Cantwell survey (Fight, 2001), unsolicited ratings represented 
between 6% (S&P) and 26.6% (Fitch) of the total number of credit ratings assigned in 
industrial countries in 2000. In another survey conducted by Baker and Mansi (2002), 
US firms with an unsolicited rating averaged 10.6% of the total number of firms with a 
credit rating in 1999. In Europe, the phenomenon of unsolicited ratings is believed to be 
substantially smaller (Basel Committee, 2000). In fact, issuers located in developing 
countries appear to be the main targets of unsolicited ratings. Evidence from Bankscope 
for instance indicates that almost 80% of S&P’s unsolicited bank ratings were assigned in 
Africa, South America and Asia (excluding Japan) in February 2005.       
Interestingly, credit rating agencies do not talk about solicited versus unsolicited 
ratings but use a softer terminology. In 1996, S&P started issuing unsolicited ratings 
under the name “public information ratings”, mainly to companies in the insurance and 
banking sectors. These ratings, which appear with a “pi” subscript in its publications, 
are assigned by broad numerical categories without a + or — modifier (i.e. AAA, AA...). 
Contrary to S&P, Moody’s policy has long been not to disclose whether a rating was 
solicited or not. Due to market pressure, it finally announced in 1999 that it would 
identify in its initial rating assignment announcements the unsolicited ratings for which 
the issuer had declined its invitation to participate in the assignment process (Moody’s, 
1999). Since January 2000, the following statement appears in the first press release 
accompanying the assignment of an unsolicited rating by Moody’s: “This rating was 
initiated by Moody’s. The issuer did not participate in the assignment process”. 
However, there is no additional designation after this and unsolicited ratings are also not 
reported in Moody’s regular publications. Fitch, the third biggest player in the credit 
rating industry, issues unsolicited ratings under the name “shadow ratings” to various 
types of financial instruments and entities. Most of these unsolicited ratings are not 
disclosed to the public, except for those assigned to banks, which are the subject of this 
paper.  
Data for the banking sector show that the number of unsolicited ratings has dropped 
over the last years. Banks with a public information rating accounted for 9% of banks 
with a local currency rating from S&P in February 2005, down from 18% five years 
earlier. Fitch has also decreased its issuance of shadow ratings in proportion of the total 
number of bank individual ratings, from 14% in February 2002 to 9% three years later.   8
While no data are available for Moody’s, it insists that it has almost completely 
curtailed its assignment of unsolicited ratings (Moody’s, 2003). 
  Despite their relatively low frequency and the recent decrease in their number, 
unsolicited ratings have come under the attention of several regulatory bodies as part of 
wider investigations into the role and function of credit rating agencies. In 2003, the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) issued a report where it expressed its 
concerns about credit rating agencies engaging in specified practices with respect to 
unsolicited ratings (e.g., sending a bill for an unsolicited rating, sending a fee schedule 
and “encouraging” payment, indicating that a rating might be improved with the 
cooperation of the issuer). The SEC also mentioned that it would explore whether only 
credit rating agencies that issue clearly labelled unsolicited ratings should be granted the 
status of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (SEC, 2003). In 2004, 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) published a “Code 
of Conduct for Credit Rating Agencies” that sets out a series of measures that agencies 
should incorporate into their own codes of conduct. In particular, the code asks credit 
rating agencies to “disclose whether the issuer participated in the rating process” and to 
identify each rating not initiated at the request of an issuer as such (IOSCO, 2004). 
Interestingly, Fitch’s reply was that it did “not believe that it is necessary or appropriate 
to require the disclosure of whether a rating is initiated or whether the issuer has 
cooperated in the rating process” and that such requirements “interfere in the editorial 
process of the rating agencies” (Fitch, 2004a). Finally, the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (“CESR”) also recently recommended that credit rating agencies 
disclose whether they initiate their credit ratings and whether the issuer participates in 
the rating assessment process (CESR, 2005).  
 
2.2   Review of the literature  
 
This paper is related to the literature on unsolicited credit ratings, which can be 
divided into four groups of papers. The first set of papers (Poon [2003a], Poon [2003b] 
and Poon and Firth [2004]) attempts to control for sample selection to see whether there 
is a difference in treatment between solicited and unsolicited ratings. The second set of 
papers (Butler and Rodgers [2003] and Gan [2004]) stresses the role of private vs. public 
information in explaining differences in treatment between solicited and unsolicited 
ratings. Since these first two groups of papers are most closely related to this study, I   9
will compare them to my paper in detail. The third set of papers (Byoun and Shin [2003] 
and Güttler et al. [2005])  is concerned with the stock market reaction to unsolicited 
ratings. Finally, the fourth set of papers (Cantor and Packer [1997] and Feinberg et al. 
[2004]) compares the ratings of several credit rating agencies with different degrees of 
reliance on unsolicited ratings.  
The first group of papers focuses on different samples of unsolicited ratings assigned 
to banks and insurance companies by S&P and Fitch
6 but adopts the same econometric 
approach, i.e. a standard model of sample selection which accounts for self-selection into 
solicited status. Sample selection is indeed a concern, since there may be systematic 
reasons why issuers with a rating choose to request one. Failure to control for this will 
yield inconsistent parameter estimates (Heckman, 1979). The results of these papers 
provide conflicting evidence of sample selection in credit ratings: Poon (2003a) and Poon 
and Firth (2004) find evidence that issuers with worse financial characteristics self-select 
into the solicited group while Poon (2003b) finds evidence that issuers with better 
financial characteristics self-select into the solicited group. Since these papers use a 
standard model of sample selection instead of a treatment effect model or an endogenous 
switching regression model (cf. section 4), they are unable to estimate the impact of 
soliciting a rating while simultaneously controlling for the selection bias. As a result, 
they rely on a matching technique to investigate whether unsolicited ratings are lower 
than solicited ones ceteris paribus. This technique consists in pairing solicited and 
unsolicited issuers with similar financial profiles in order to eliminate the selection bias. 
Poon (2003a), Poon (2003b) and Poon and Firth (2004) pair between one-twentieth and 
one-third of issuers by matching their sovereign rating and four financial ratios from the 
key financial areas considered to be important in determining credit ratings. The results 
of the matching sub-samples indicate that unsolicited ratings are still lower than solicited 
ones after controlling for differences in financial profile and sample selection. Though the 
above findings are interesting, it is important to highlight that they are based on a 
minority of the sample firms with no more than five common characteristics. Moreover, 
Heckman et al. (1998) point out that matching is not, in general, guaranteed to reduce 
sample selection bias and that it may even increase it.  
                                                           
6 Poon (2003a) uses S&P’s ratings of 265 insurance companies in 15 mostly developing countries; 
Poon (2003b) considers S&P’s ratings of 171 banks in 20 mostly developing countries; Poon and 
Firth (2004) use Fitch’s ratings of 951 banks in 82 countries. The latter paper is based on a 
sample that includes non-Asian banks, which is incorrect since Fitch does not assign unsolicited 
bank ratings outside Asia (see section 3.1).    10
The second group of papers focuses on US bonds rated by Moody’s and S&P. Since 
both agencies do not distinguish between solicited and unsolicited ratings in the US 
market, these papers rely on estimated fees paid to rating agencies to infer if issuers have 
or not asked for a rating and how many rating agencies they have hired.
7 Butler and 
Rodgers (2003) use cross-sectional regressions to see if high rating fees — assumed to 
proxy for solicited status — are associated with ratings which are more favourable to the 
issuer. They also interact several financial variables with a “high rating fee” dummy in 
order to isolate the marginal effect that soliciting a rating has on how ratings are 
affected by firm fundamentals. The authors find that solicited ratings are not higher 
ceteris paribus and that the marginal effect of soliciting a rating is to decrease the 
impact that most financial variables have on credit ratings. They interpret these findings 
as evidence that credit rating agencies do not suffer from a conflict of interest and that 
soliciting a rating induces them to place less weight on public information in favour of 
some private information. These results should be interpreted with caution as the 
authors have chosen to exclude bonds with zero rating fees from their sample in order to 
control for sample selection. Since almost every zero rating fees bond is unsolicited, this 
is likely to create an even bigger selection problem in their sample.  
Gan (2004) investigates the question of whether there is a difference in treatment 
between solicited and unsolicited ratings by relying on an ex ante and an ex post 
approach. The ex ante approach consists in a cross-sectional regression that looks at 
whether unsolicited ratings are lower than solicited ones while controlling for issuers’ 
characteristics. The ex post approach consists in a cross-sectional regression that looks at 
whether unsolicited ratings perform better than solicited ones after the issuance of the 
rating while controlling for issuers’ characteristics. Gan finds a statistically significant 
difference between the rating assigned to solicited and unsolicited issuers in her ex ante 
regression but no statistically significant difference between their subsequent 
performance — measured by Altman’s Z-score — in her ex post regression. This result 
leads Gan to reject what she calls the “punishment hypothesis”, which states that, if 
issuers were truly discriminated against, they should not only receive lower credit ratings 
ex ante but they should also exhibit stronger performance ex post. Gan concludes that 
her results are rather consistent with a self-selection bias based on private information 
                                                           
7 This approach requires the choice of a rating fee threshold above (below) which ratings are 
considered to be solicited (unsolicited). Gan (2004) relies on fee schedules estimates while Butler 
and Rodgers (2003) split their sample into two groups of bonds: those with high rating fees 
(assumed to be solicited) and those with median or low rating fees (assumed to be unsolicited).    11
without, however, explicitly testing that firms with more favourable private information 
self-select into the solicited group.  
In light of the above-mentioned studies, the main contributions of this paper are 
threefold. First, this paper investigates whether there is a difference in treatment 
between solicited and unsolicited bank ratings using a sample where both types of 
ratings are identified as such. I believe that this represents an advantage over Butler and 
Rodgers (2003) and Gan (2004), who are unable to distinguish clearly between solicited 
and unsolicited ratings. Second, this study addresses the issue of self-selection carefully 
through the use of a treatment effect model and an endogenous switching regression 
model. These models allow to measure treatment effects and program effectiveness while 
simultaneously controlling for sample selection (Greene, 2003). As a result, this paper 
improves on Poon (2003a), Poon (2003b) and Poon and Firth (2004) who use Heckman’s 
standard model of sample selection and on Butler and Rodgers (2003) and Gan (2004) 
who do not adequately or explicitly control for sample selection (“self-selection 
hypothesis”). Third, this study tests whether the difference in treatment between 
solicited and unsolicited ratings disappears when banks with an unsolicited rating release 
enough public information to compensate for the absence of private information (“public 
disclosure hypothesis”). This hypothesis has not yet been tested in the literature. In the 
remainder of this section, I briefly discuss some studies on unsolicited ratings which are 
less closely related to this paper. 
The third group of papers uses credit ratings of non-US issuers to study the stock 
market reaction to unsolicited ratings. Byoun and Shin (2003) analyse a sample of firms 
rated by S&P between 1996 and 2002 of which a majority are from Japan. They set up a 
model in which unsolicited ratings bring about market reaction due to signalling effects: 
bad firms choose not to signal in equilibrium and their quality is revealed by their 
unsolicited rating. Consistent with the implications of the model, they find that many 
unsolicited ratings are rated speculative grade, while most solicited ratings are rated 
investment grade. Furthermore, they find negative market reactions to downgrade 
announcements and positive market reactions to upgrade announcements for unsolicited 
ratings but only positive market reactions to upgrade announcements for solicited 
ratings. They interpret this result as being consistent with the model implication that 
the market reacts strongly to news about unsolicited ratings. Güttler et al. (2005) focus 
on a majority of Asian firms rated by S&P between 1996 and 2004 and restrict their 
sample to shifts from an unsolicited to a solicited status. Their main finding is that stock   12
returns react negatively to the announcement of a downgrade but do not react to the 
announcement of an upgrade following a change in the solicitation status. The authors 
take this finding as evidence that the market believes that unsolicited ratings suffer from 
a downward bias, i.e. the market only reacts to downgrades because they reveal new 
information, while it does not react to upgrades because they represent a natural 
correction after a shift from an unsolicited to a solicited status.  
Finally, the fourth set of papers compares the ratings of several credit rating agencies 
with different degrees of reliance on unsolicited ratings. Cantor and Packer (1997) 
compare corporate credit ratings of two agencies publishing both solicited and unsolicited 
ratings in the US (Moody’s and S&P) with those of two agencies mainly issuing solicited 
ratings in the US (Fitch and Duff & Phelps). They find that corporate credit ratings 
issued by Moody’s and S&P tend to be lower on average than those assigned by Fitch 
and Duff & Phelps and that this result does not reflect a sample selection bias, i.e. firms 
do not engage in “rating shopping” by seeking a rating from more favourable agencies. 
Feinberg et al. (2004) also find that credit rating agencies with both solicited and 
unsolicited ratings tend to issue lower ratings on average although they do not control 
for sample selection. In addition, they find that credit rating agencies publishing mostly 
solicited ratings are less likely to be downgrade leaders and to assign more severe 
downgrades than rating agencies which issue both solicited and unsolicited ratings. These 
results suggest that agencies relying extensively on solicited ratings may be more 
reluctant to upset issuers.  
 
 
3  Brief history and sample  
 
3.1   History of Fitch’s unsolicited bank ratings 
 
Fitch started to issue unsolicited bank ratings after its acquisition of Thomson 
BankWatch in October 2000. Prior to its absorption by Fitch, BankWatch — then the 
largest bank credit rating agency in the world — used two types of rating scales in 
emerging markets, the so-called “intra-country issuer rating” and  “credit evaluation 
rating” scales. The latter scale mainly applied to unsolicited ratings of smaller 
institutions or banks in Asia. However, BankWatch did not to always disclose whether a 
rating was paid for or not. In an effort to promote transparency, Fitch announced that   13
ratings that were part of BankWatch’s credit evaluation scale and that were not solicited 
would be appended with an “s” (shadow) following their integration into its rating 
system in order to indicate that they were mainly based on public information. Fitch 
nevertheless insisted that the methodology behind these “shadow” (unsolicited) ratings 
and the more traditional “full due diligence” (solicited) ratings was almost the same and 
that their definition and scale were identical (Fitch, 2001).  
Figure 1 reports the number of solicited and unsolicited bank ratings in the sample 
countries (see section 3.2) between April 2001 and September 2004. The issuance of 
unsolicited ratings started in June 2001 and was completed five months later, in 
November. Unsolicited ratings initially totalled 113, more than twice the number of 
solicited ratings (54). The number of unsolicited ratings remained stable until mid-2002 
before decreasing toward the end of the period surveyed. As of September 2004, the 
number of banks with an unsolicited rating was 93 and the number of banks with a 
solicited rating was 76 in the sample countries. Interestingly, eleven banks moved from 
an unsolicited to a solicited status between 2001 and 2004 (the rest of the decrease in the 
number of unsolicited ratings being mainly attributable to mergers, acquisitions and 
liquidations). Out of these eleven banks, five benefited from a one notch increase in their 
rating following the announcement that they had started to pay a rating fee, whereas 
none had its rating lowered. Two banks also stopped paying for their rating over the 
period considered and they both immediately had their rating downgraded by one notch. 
Of course, these figures do not control for changes in financial profiles and for a 
selectivity bias, i.e. banks may start requesting (giving up) a rating when their financial 
fundamentals start improving (deteriorating). 
It should also be noted that Fitch’s unsolicited bank ratings are individual ratings, 
which differ from the more well-known debt ratings. Individual ratings focus on the 
ability of issuers to satisfy their obligations in general, irrespective of the terms of any 
particular debt obligation. They thus differ from debt ratings, which attempt to assess 
the risk that an issuer will not repay a specific security or class of securities, e.g. long-
term debt. In addition, individual ratings do not take into account external support that 
an issuer might receive from a parent company or from its country of incorporation, 
which means in practice that they are not constrained by a sovereign ceiling like debt 
ratings. In a nutshell, bank individual ratings attempt to assess the overall   14
creditworthiness of a bank on a standalone basis.
8 The purpose of bank individual ratings 
is also different from bank debt ratings. Debt ratings are used almost exclusively by 
investors and regulators, while the primary customers of individual ratings are 
commercial banks which need to set lines of credit with financial institutions they are 
dealing with, especially in trade finance transactions such as letters of credit.  
 
3.2   Sample 
 
The bank individual ratings and the corresponding financial information used in this 
study were obtained from Bankscope and Fitch Research. The initial sample consisted of 
Fitch’s ratings of Asian banks as of January 31, 2004 (cf. Table 1).
9 The sample was 
further restricted to ratings of banks located in countries that have both solicited and 
unsolicited ratings (these countries are shown in italics in Table 1). 
Among the sample countries, Taiwan, India and Hong Kong are the countries with 
the highest number of bank individual ratings, with respectively 39 banks (23.1% of 
observations), 32 banks (18.9% of observations) and 18 banks (10.7% of observations). 
Unsolicited ratings constitute the majority of ratings in the sample countries with 95 
banks (56.2% of observations). Solicited ratings account for the remainder of the sample 
with 74 banks (43.8% of observations). The number of solicited and unsolicited ratings is 
roughly equal in two countries (Hong Kong and Taiwan) while the other sample 
countries have a vast majority of solicited ratings (Indonesia, Macau, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and South Korea) or unsolicited ratings (Bangladesh, China, India and 
Vietnam). Obviously, a plausible explanation for this imbalance is that banks located in 
countries with weakly developed banking markets hardly borrow in the international 
interbank market and, as a consequence, do not require an individual rating. Another 
possible explanation is that banks located in countries with very different regulatory 
systems and/or accounting standards prefer to be rated by local credit rating agencies 
(Poon, 2003a). 
Table 2 lists the frequency and percentage of solicited and unsolicited ratings by 
rating level for the 169 sample banks. Note that, contrary to Fitch’s debt ratings which 
use the standard AAA to D rating scale, Fitch’s individual ratings rest on an A to E 
                                                           
8 Individual ratings are also known as “financial strength” ratings at Moody’s and Capital 
Intelligence. Their complete definition is provided in the Appendix. 
9 The panel structure of the data is not exploited in this paper since there are only thirteen 
solicitation changes between 2001 and 2004 (cf. section 3.1).    15
classification with intermediate categories i.e. A/B, B/C, C/D and D/E. The rating 
category with the highest number of sample banks is the D category (40 banks or 23.7% 
of observations) while no sample bank falls in the A category. Less than a third of the 
sample banks (49 banks or 29% of observations) obtain C ratings or above, meaning that 
their overall creditworthiness is adequate to (very) strong. The remaining sample banks 
(120 banks or 71% of observations) are classified below C, meaning that their overall 
creditworthiness is somewhat weak to very weak. Solicited ratings mostly fall into the 
B/C to D categories whereas unsolicited ratings are concentrated in the C to E 
categories. The fact that unsolicited ratings are more concentrated across the rating scale 
tends to confirm the perception of many issuers that these ratings are less accurate than 
solicited ones (Baker and Mansi, 2002).       
Table 3 compares the mean and standard deviation of some financial and non-
financial characteristics in the solicited and unsolicited groups (the t-statistic for mean 
equality is given in the last column). As Fitch asks for a minimum of three years’ annual 
data and a maximum of five years’ when assigning a new rating, this paper uses the five-
year average (1999 to 2003) of variables if available and their three-year average (2001 
to 2003) if not. The variables in the table were selected according to Fitch’s bank rating 
methodology (Fitch, 2004b), which indicates that Fitch bases its bank individual ratings 
on a number of quantitative and qualitative factors that can be classified into nine 
categories: (1) risk management; (2) funding and liquidity; (3) capitalisation; (4) 
securitisation; (5) earnings and performance; (6) market environment; (7) diversification 
of business and franchise; (8) management and strategy and (9) corporate governance. 
Using this classification, the variables which exhibit the strongest correlation with 
Fitch’s individual ratings are reported in Table 3.
10 In addition, Fitch also emphasises its 
need for a detailed breakdown of banks’ balance sheet and income statement when 
assigning a rating. This particular requirement is captured by a disclosure index, which 
can be found at the bottom of Table 3. The disclosure index records whether or not 
banks provide information on 147 items in their published financial statements as 
mentioned in Bankscope.
11 The 147 items include balance sheet items (97), income 
statement items (37) and note items (13). The disclosure index is normalised between 0 
and 100.  
                                                           
10 Table 1A in the Appendix shows the definition, unit and summary statistics of each variable. 
11 The disclosure index used in this study is similar to and highly correlated with the disclosure 
index used by Baumann and Nier (2003). The main difference is that Baumann and Nier’s index 
is restricted to 18 core categories, some of them arbitrarily weighted.    16
Looking at the variables in the first five categories of Table 3, banks with an 
unsolicited rating have better asset quality (i.e. lower impaired loans/gross loans) but 
are less liquid and less capitalised than banks with a solicited rating. The difference 
between the performance of the solicited and unsolicited groups (as measured by the 
return on assets and the cost to income ratio) is not found to be statistically significant, 
while no variable related to the securitisation category could be found in Bankscope. The 
variables in the last five categories of Table 3 provide information about mostly non-
financial characteristics of banks. Banks which request a rating are more likely to have a 
financial statement which is consolidated (62.2% in the solicited group vs. 44.2% in the 
unsolicited group) and which has been approved by the auditors without qualification 
(88.3% in the solicited group vs. 77.2% in the unsolicited group). There are more 
commercial banks in the unsolicited group (94.7%) than in the solicited one (77.0%) 
while non-banking credit institutions all have a solicited rating. Interestingly, the 
sovereign credit rating and the diversification/franchise variables do not differ 
significantly across solicited status. Corporate governance variables show that banks 
with an unsolicited rating are located in countries with worse corporate governance 
practices than banks with a solicited rating. Moreover, banks requesting a rating have a 
statistically higher degree of involvement of individuals and/or families in their 
ownership (4.3% of equity owned by this type of shareholders in the solicited group vs. 
0.4% in the unsolicited group), while banks that choose not to be rated have stronger 
ties to the State (28.3% of equity owned by this type of shareholders in the unsolicited 
group vs. 9.1% in the solicited group). In addition, banks rated on a solicited basis have 
significantly more subsidiaries (7.0) than banks rated on an unsolicited basis (3.2). This 
result does not seem to proxy for a size effect since the difference between the means of 
the “total deposits” variable in the solicited and unsolicited groups was not significant. 
Finally, the last row of Table 3 indicates that banks with a solicited rating disclose 
significantly more public information than banks with an unsolicited rating. However, 
the difference between the level of public disclosure of the two groups is very small 
(1.8%), meaning that banks with a solicited rating disclose on average only 2.6 items 
(out of a possible 147) more than banks with an unsolicited rating. 
Overall, the evidence presented in Table 2 indicates that unsolicited ratings tend to 
be more frequently assigned at the lower end of the rating scale than solicited ones, while 
Table 3 shows some differences in the characteristics of the solicited and unsolicited 
groups. In order to answer the question of whether the differences in financial and non-  17
financial characteristics or a sample selection bias can account for the lower unsolicited 
ratings, I now turn to the econometric analysis.  
 
 
4 Econometric  framework  
 
4.1   Ordinary least squares 
 
To test whether banks with a solicited rating and those with an unsolicited rating 
obtain the same rating ceteris paribus, I first use a simple ordinary least squares 
regression. The analysis is based on a regression of the form:  
  ii i i Rating X Solicited =+ + β δε     (1)
where Ratingi corresponds to the individual rating of bank i coded on a 9 (A) to      
1 (E) scale, Xi is a matrix of financial and non-financial characteristics that explain the 
individual rating of bank i and Solicitedi is a dummy variable that equals one if bank i 
has requested an individual rating and zero otherwise. Although the dependent variable 
in equation (1) takes nine different discrete values, this paper treats Rating as a 
continuous variable, essentially for two reasons. First, researchers often treat discrete 
variables as continuous when the range of values that they take is large enough and 
when the gaps between successive values are equivalent (e.g. Abrevaya and Hausman, 
1999). Since individual are divided into nine categories and the common practice is to 
standardise rating categories into numbers, Rating may be thus reasonably treated as a 
continuous variable. Second, the existing literature on the determinants of credit ratings 
indicates that this type of analysis is not particularly sensitive to the choice between 
ordinary least squares and ordered probit, a statistical model for discrete random 
variables (see for instance Pottier and Sommer, 1999).
12  
Looking at equation (1), the coefficient of Solicitedi,  δ,  measures the so-called 
treatment effect. The “treatment” in this context is whether or not banks have requested 
an individual rating from Fitch. The null hypothesis to be tested is whether  = 0 δ , i.e. 
whether soliciting a rating has no effect on the rating itself once controlling for relevant 
                                                           
12 As a robustness check, I have estimated equation (1) using ordinary least squares and ordered 
probit. The results, which are shown in the Appendix (Table 2A), indicate that both methods 
classify the same variables as significant and have very similar prediction rates.   18
bank characteristics. One issue that arises in this setup is the potential endogeneity of 
the variable Solicitedi i.e. the possibility that  ii Solicited ε ≠ E( ) 0, yielding biased and 
inconsistent least squares estimates. For instance, if the typical bank which chooses to 
request a rating would have a relatively high rating whether or not it asked to be rated, 
there will be a positive correlation between Solicitedi and  i ε . In this case, the least 
squares estimates of δ  will actually overestimate the treatment effect. Therefore, I use 
two extensions of the standard model of sample selection due to Heckman (1979) to 
account for potential self-selection into solicited status (see for instance Greene, 2003).  
 
4.2   Treatment effect model 
 
The treatment effect model complements the outcome equation (1) with the 
following latent model: 
 
*
iii Solicited W u γ =+   (2)
 
*
ii Solicited Solicited => 1  if     0, 0 otherwise   (3)
where W collects all variables in X plus any other variables that affect the decision 
to request an individual rating but not the rating itself. The model further assumes that 
X and W are exogenous and that ε and u follow a bivariate normal distribution with 
mean vector zero and covariance matrix Ω equal to:  










2      (4)
where  ε σ
2 is the variance of the error term in the outcome equation,  u σ
2  the variance 
of the error term in the selection equation and  u ε σ the covariance between both error 
terms. Since γ can be estimated only up to a scale factor, it is assumed that  u σ =
2 1 hence 
u εε σρ σ =  where ρ is the coefficient of correlation between ε and u.  
Using equation (1), one can show that the expected rating conditional on having 
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where φ  denotes the normal density function and Φ the normal cumulative function. 
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The difference in expected rating between banks which request a rating and those 
which do not is given by the difference between equations (5) and (6) i.e. 
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where the first term on the right-hand side, δ, measures the treatment effect and the 
second term in brackets is the hazard rate. If the latter term is omitted from equation 
(1), the above difference is what is estimated by the least squares coefficient of the 
dummy variable Solicitedi. For instance, in the presence of positive self-selection ( ρ>0), 
the second term in (7) is positive hence the least squares estimator of δ overestimates the 
treatment effect.  
The model described by equations (1) to (3) can be consistently estimated by either 
maximum likelihood or a two-step method. The latter method consists in estimating a 
probit equation for the probability of soliciting a rating, before estimating equation (1) 
augmented with the hazard rate obtained from the probit equation (the standard errors 
of the least squares estimates must be corrected). A test for  0 ε ρσ =  is a test of selection 
based on unobservable rating determinants. If  ε ρσ  is not significantly different from zero, 
one may reasonably decide that selectivity is not a problem and proceed to use ordinary 
least squares instead of a treatment effect model (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). 
 
4.3   Endogenous switching regression model 
 
All methods examined so far are based on the outcome equation (1), which assumes 
that soliciting a rating has only an intercept effect on individual ratings. However, 
soliciting a rating may also have a slope effect, i.e. the coefficients of the Xs may differ 
according to the solicited status. In addition, the above models assume that the variance 
of the unobserved component of individual ratings, which includes private information, is 
the same for banks with a solicited rating and for banks with an unsolicited rating. A 
more general version of the outcome equation, which allows for treatment heterogeneity 
and for error terms with different variances, is given by:   20
  ii i Rating X βε =+ 11 1   if Solicitedi = 0    (8)
  ii i Rating X βε =+ 22 2   if Solicitedi = 1    (9)
  where it is assumed that X is exogenous and that ε1, ε2 and u follow a trivariate 





















    (10)
where  σ
2
1 and  σ
2
2 are the variances of the error terms in the outcome equations,  u σ
2  
the variance of the error term in the selection equation and  u σ1 and  u σ2 the covariances 
between ε1 and u and ε2 and u, respectively (the covariance between the error terms in 
the outcome equations is not defined since Rating1i and Rating2i are never observed 
simultaneously). Since γ can be estimated only up to a scale factor, it is assumed that 
u σ =
2 1 hence  11 1 σρ σ = uu  and  22 2 σρ σ = uu  where  1 ρ u and  2 ρ u  are the coefficients of 
correlation between ε1 and u and ε2 and u, respectively. 
Let the decision to request a rating be generated from the same model described by 
equations (2) and (3). One can show that the expected rating conditional on having 
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The difference in expected rating between banks which request a rating and those 
which do not is given by the difference between equations (11) and (12) i.e. 
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where the first term on the right-hand side, Xi(β2 – β1), is the “average treatment 
effect” (ATE) which measures the average gain or loss from soliciting a rating for a 
randomly chosen bank (this quantity was denoted by δ in the models of subsections 4.1   21
and 4.2). Wooldridge (2002) shows that, under fairly weak assumptions, a consistent 
estimator of the average treatment effect is given by:  
  () ˆˆ ˆ X 21 ATE ββ =−     (14)
where ¯ is used to denote average and ˆ parameter estimates obtained by estimating 
the system formed by equations (2)-(3) and (8)-(9).  
Another quantity of interest in this model is the “average treatment effect on the 
treated” (ATT), which measures the average gain or loss from soliciting a rating for 
those banks which have requested a rating. Formally, the average treatment effect on the 
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where  X2i denotes Xi in the group of banks with a solicited rating. A consistent 
estimator of the average treatment effect on the treated is given by:  
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A test for  22 11 0 ρσ ρσ == uu  is a test of selection based on unobservable rating 
determinants. If the test fails to reject that both parameters are jointly equal to zero, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no selectivity bias in the solicited and unsolicited 
groups and we have no argument against using ordinary least squares. A Chow test can 
also be used to test whether the βs are identical in the solicited and unsolicited groups. If 
they are, the treatment effect model of the previous subsection is more efficient than the 
model described by equations (2)-(3) and (8)-(9).  
The endogenous switching regression model is estimated by maximum likelihood 
using the procedure outlined in Greene (1995).    
 
 
5 Results  
 
Two basic specifications of equation (1) are reported in Table 4. The first 
specification includes five financial variables and three non-financial variables in addition 
to a Solicited individual rating dummy. These variables cover the different areas of   22
Fitch’s bank rating methodology: risk management (Loan loss provisions/Net interest 
revenue), liquidity (Net loans/Total assets), capitalisation (Equity/Total assets), 
earnings and performance (C o s t  t o  i n c o m e  r a t i o ), market environment (Consolidated 
statement dummy), diversification/franchise (Log of total deposits), corporate governance 
(Bank ownership dummy — one if the bank is majority-owned by another bank and zero 
otherwise) and public disclosure (Disclosure index). The second specification adds two 
variables that control for additional aspects of market environment (Unqualified 
statement dummy) and corporate governance (State ownership dummy — one if the bank 
is majority-owned by the State and zero otherwise). Finally, the Solicited individual 
rating dummy is interacted with an Other individual rating dummy (one if the bank had 
an individual rating from Moody’s or Capital Intelligence before it obtained an 
individual rating from Fitch and zero otherwise). The resulting variable captures 
whether there is a difference in rating between banks which request an individual rating 
without being rated by a competitor of Fitch and banks which request an individual 
rating while being rated by a competitor of Fitch. Such a difference may exist if banks 
which are rated by a competitor agency engage in “rating shopping” and only request an 
individual rating from Fitch when they are a confident that it will be higher than their 
existing individual rating.
13 The two specifications are estimated by ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and by instrumental variables (IV) to account for the potential 
endogeneity of the Equity/Total assets and Disclosure index variables. The instruments 
for both variables consist of the exogenous variables in both specifications and country 
dummies that reflect the average level of the intrumented variables in each country. A 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of the null hypothesis that OLS delivers consistent estimates 
was carried out. The value of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic in specifications (1) and 
(2) is 2.28 and 3.32, respectively, with associated probabilities of 0.32 and 0.19. This 
means that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that any endogeneity of Equity/Total 
assets and Disclosure index does not have deleterious effects on OLS estimates in both 
specifications. The discussion of Table 4 will therefore be based on the OLS results. 
The coefficient of the Solicited individual rating dummy in specifications (1) and (2) 
is equal to 0.829 and 1.208, respectively, and is highly significant. This means that there 
is an important premium for banks which request an individual rating once controlling 
                                                           
13 Note that no bank with an unsolicited rating from Fitch is rated by Moody’s or Capital 
Intelligence, which prevents analysing whether there is a difference in the way Fitch treats banks 
not soliciting a rating but having a rating from a competitor agency versus banks that have no 
other rating.   23
for other rating determinants. For other variables, the results appear to be standard. For 
example, Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue and Cost to income ratio negatively 
impact individual ratings, while Equity/Total assets,  Consolidated statement dummy, 
Bank ownership dummy and  Disclosure index are positively associated with Fitch’s 
assessments of banks’ financial strength. Interestingly, the coefficient of the Disclosure 
index is equal to 0.14 in both specifications, meaning that banks which increase by 7% 
the number of items that they report in Bankscope’s global detailed format raise their 
individual rating by one notch on average. Other variables common to both 
specifications as well as the variables added in the second specification are not 
significant. In particular, the marginal effect that the Other individual rating dummy has 
on how Rating is affected by the Solicited individual rating dummy is zero. The statistics 
at the bottom of the table also indicate that the two specifications have similar 
prediction rates and classify about one-third of banks in the correct rating category and 
about one-half in the rating category immediately above or below the actual rating. 
Since the variables added in specification (2) are not significant, I will work with 
specification (1) from now on. 
Table 5 further investigates the impact of soliciting a rating by interacting the rating 
determinants with the Solicited individual rating dummy and adding the resulting 
variables to specification (1).
14 The model is estimated by ordinary least squares and by 
instrumental variables. As in Table 4, a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test does not reject the 
null hypothesis that OLS delivers consistent parameter estimates (the test statistic is 
1.43 with an associated probability of 0.23). The results in Table 5 show that the 
marginal effect that soliciting a rating has on how individual ratings are affected by bank 
fundamentals is zero for each variable except for Net loans/Total assets. An F-test 
further fails to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the rating determinants 
are the same in the solicited and unsolicited groups (the test statistic is 1.25 with an 
associated probability of 0.27). Together with the results of specification (1), this 
indicates that the Solicited individual rating dummy has an intercept effect but no slope 
effect on individual ratings. Thus, specification (1) of Table 4 appears to be appropriate 
to study the determinants of individual ratings.             
The coefficient of the Solicited individual rating dummy in specification (1) suggests 
that there is an important difference in treatment between banks that ask for a rating 
and those which do not. However, ordinary least squares may overestimate the impact of 
                                                           
14 For comparison purposes, specification (1) of Table 4 is also reported in Table 5.   24
the treatment if banks that request a rating are positively self-selected. For this reason, I 
proceed to use the methods described in section 4 to correct for the potential sample 
selection bias.   
Table 6 presents the estimates of the treatment effect model. The first two columns 
report the results of a two-step method which treats Equity/Total assets and Disclosure 
index as exogenous, while the last two columns report the results of a three-step method 
which consists in instrumenting both variables before applying the two-step method.
15 
For each method (two-step and three-step), the table reports the results of the selection 
and of the outcome equation.  
For identification purposes, the selection equation must include at least one variable 
that affects the decision to ask for a rating but not the rating itself. The variable which 
enters the selection equation but not the outcome equation is Solicited long-term debt 
rating dummy (one if the bank had a solicited long-term debt rating from Fitch before it 
obtained an individual rating and zero otherwise).
16 This variable is used as an exclusion 
restriction because Fitch started to issue long-term debt ratings in the 1980s, long before 
individual ratings. Therefore, banks which initially requested a long-term debt rating 
from Fitch should be more likely to have subsequently asked for an individual rating. At 
the same time, it is unlikely that paying for a long-term debt rating influenced the 
individual rating. Since I view the decision to request an individual rating as a sequential 
process (i.e. banks’ decision to buy an individual rating was influenced by their decision 
for the long-term debt rating), I treat the Solicited long-term debt rating dummy as a 
lagged endogenous variable which does not have to be instrumented.  
The results of the two- and three-step methods in Table 6 are relatively similar.       
I will therefore focus on the two-step results. Looking at the selection equation, the signs 
of the estimates suggest that smaller banks with a consolidated statement, a high level of 
public disclosure and a solicited long-term debt rating from Fitch are more likely to 
request an individual rating. Interestingly, banks with a better financial profile (as 
measured by Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue,  Net loans/Total assets, 
Equity/Total assets and Cost to income ratio) are not more likely to be rated on a 
                                                           
15 As in Tables 4 and 5, the instruments for Equity/Total assets and Disclosure index consist of 
the exogenous variables in specification (1) and country dummies. The t-statistics of the 
parameter estimates in the three-step method are computed by bootstrapping.  
16 For the minority of banks which obtained both types of ratings at the same time, the Solicited 
long-term debt rating dummy is thus equal to zero. Setting the Solicited long-term debt rating 
dummy to one if the bank had a solicited long-term debt rating before or at the same time it 
obtained an individual rating and zero otherwise does not affect the results.   25
solicited basis. The statistics at the bottom of the selection equation also indicate that 
the model correctly predicts the decision to request an individual rating for roughly two-
third of banks. Looking at the outcome equation, the estimates and their significance are 
in line with those reported in Table 4 except for the Solicited individual rating dummy, 
which is now insignificant. However, the coefficient of the hazard rate is insignificant so 
there is no evidence that there is a selectivity problem in the outcome equation. The 
statistics at the bottom of the outcome equation also show that the classification 
accuracy of the treatment effect model is comparable to that of ordinary least squares.  
  The results so far could be due to the fact that the above models are misspecified or 
too restrictive. For this reason, I consider a more general framework which allows the 
parameters of the outcome equation to differ according to whether or not banks have 
solicited a rating, while simultaneously controlling for sample selection. The results of 
the endogenous switching regression model are reported in Table 7 (the results of the 
selection equation are omitted). The first two outcome equations treat Equity/Total 
assets and Disclosure index as exogenous while the last two outcome equations adopt an 
instrumental variable approach which consists in instrumenting both variables before 
performing the maximum likelihood estimation.
17  
Looking at Table 7, three variables (Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue, Cost 
to income ratio and Disclosure index) are jointly significant in the unsolicited and 
solicited groups in the first two outcome equations and only one (Cost to income ratio) 
in the last two outcome equations. The coefficients of these variables have the expected 
sign, i.e. Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue and Cost to income ratio negatively 
impact individual ratings, while Disclosure index is positively related to Fitch’s 
assessment of banks’ financial strength. The statistics at the bottom of the table indicate 
that the classification accuracy of the model is slightly better in the unsolicited than in 
the solicited group. For clarity reasons, I will focus on the first two outcome equations to 
further discuss the results of the endogenous switching regression model (the last two 
outcome equations offer similar results). 
First, a Chow test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of individual rating 
determinants are the same in the solicited and unsolicited groups was carried out. The 
value of the test statistic is 0.78 with an associated probability of 0.63, meaning that one
                                                           
17 The set of instruments for Equity/Total assets and Disclosure index are the same as in Tables 4 
to 6. The t-statistics of the parameter estimates in the last two outcome equations are computed 
by bootstrapping.    26
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of individual rating determinants 
are identical in both groups. This result is consistent with the findings in Table 5 but 
contrasts with Butler and Rodgers (2003) who find that soliciting a rating induces 
Moody’s and S&P to place less weight on rating determinants reflecting public 
information. My result also contradicts the findings of Poon and Firth (2004) who 
conclude that Fitch does not use the same model in assigning solicited and unsolicited 
bank ratings and that the rating standards applied to solicited ratings are more lenient 
than those applied to unsolicited ratings. However, it important to stress that Poon and 
Firth’s results are based on a different sample of bank ratings and on a neural network 
model which reduces individual ratings to a dichotomous variable (1 if investment grade, 
0 otherwise), hence these results are not necessarily comparable with mine.   
Second, an F-test of the null hypothesis that the correlation coefficients between the 
error term in the selection equation and the error terms in the outcome equations are 
jointly insignificant was performed. The value of the test statistic is 0.13 with an 
associated probability of 0.88, meaning that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
12 and ρ ρ uu  are both equal to zero and that there is no selection bias in individual 
ratings. Thus, the results in Tables 7 (like the results in Table 6) do not support the self-
selection hypothesis and contrast with Poon (2003a), Poon (2003b) and Poon and Firth 
(2004) who find evidence of either positive or negative sample selection in S&P’s and 
Fitch’s ratings. As mentioned earlier, these papers use a standard model of sample 
selection, which is less appropriate than a treatment effect model or an endogenous 
switching regression model to study program effectiveness while simultaneously 
controlling for sample selection.  
Third, the average treatment effect and the average treatment effect on the treated, 
which measure respectively the average gain from soliciting a rating for a randomly 
chosen bank and the average gain from soliciting a rating for those banks which have 
requested one, are obtained by estimating equations (14) and (16). The average 
treatment effect (ATE) is equal to 0.669 while the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) is equal to 0.440. However, biased corrected confidence intervals based on 
1,000 bootstrap replications indicate that both effects are not significantly different from 
zero (the confidence intervals are [-0.533 ; 1.846] for ATE and [-0.612 ; 1.572] for ATT). 
Thus, the difference in treatment between solicited and unsolicited ratings is positive 
and significant when using ordinary least squares (Table 4) but insignificant when using 
a treatment effect model (Table 6) and an endogenous switching regression model (Table   27
7). An inevitable question is whether we should rely on ordinary least squares or on 
treatment effect model results.
18 On the one hand, no sample selection was detected in 
individual ratings, so one could argue that a treatment effect model is not — from a 
theoretical point of view — more appropriate than ordinary least squares. On the other 
hand, the treatment effect model has one considerable virtue: there is no justification for 
considering that the treatment is exogenous, as is assumed in ordinary least squares. 
Ordinary least squares estimates, therefore, may suffer from the inconsistency due to 
omitted variables. Fortunately, we can distinguish between the two models by using the 
specification test devised by Hausman (Greene, 2003). It is based on the idea that under 
the null hypothesis, both ordinary least squares and treatment effect estimates are 
consistent, but treatment effect estimates are inefficient, while under the alternative, 
treatment effect estimates are consistent but ordinary least squares estimates are not. 
Since the Hausman test statistic is equal to 0.023 with an associated probability of 1.0, 
one cannot reject the null hypothesis that OLS delivers consistent estimates. Thus, there 
is no argument against using ordinary least squares to study the determinants of bank 
individual ratings. I will therefore rely on this estimation technique to test the public 
disclosure hypothesis. 
The public disclosure hypothesis implies that issuers who choose not to request a 
rating and who disclose little public information will receive a low unsolicited rating, 
whereas issuers who choose not to request a rating but who provide extensive public 
information will not receive a low unsolicited rating. This hypothesis is tested using a 














    (17)
where Unsolicitedi is a dummy variable equal to one if bank i has not requested an 
individual rating and zero otherwise and High disclosurei is a dummy variable equal to 
one if bank i is a high disclosure bank and zero otherwise. If the public disclosure 
hypothesis is true, δ1 - which represents the difference between the expected rating of a 
high disclosure bank which does not request a rating and the expected rating of a bank 
which requests a rating - should be insignificant while δ2 - which represents the difference 
between the expected rating of a low disclosure bank which does not request a rating 
                                                           
18 The endogenous switching regression model is not considered since the Chow test indicates that 
it is less efficient than the treatment effect model.   28
and the expected rating of a bank which requests a rating - should be negative and 
significant. 
Measuring the marginal impact that public disclosure has on the relationship 
between  Unsolicited and Rating by a dummy variable (High disclosure) is rather 
restrictive since it assumes that Fitch behaves differently when banks pass a certain 
disclosure threshold. However, a continuous change in Fitch’s behaviour seems more 
plausible than a regime shift at a disclosure threshold specified arbitrarily. Therefore, 
equation (17) is estimated for different definitions of the High disclosure dummy: in a 
first regression, the High disclosure dummy is equal to one if the disclosure index of bank 
i is equal to or higher than the 50
th percentile of the sample distribution of disclosure 
indexes and zero otherwise; in a second regression, the High disclosure dummy is equal to 
one if the disclosure index of bank i is equal to or higher than the 51
st percentile of the 
sample distribution of disclosure indexes and zero otherwise; etc. The advantage of this 
approach is that it is unnecessary to model explicitly the marginal impact of public 
disclosure on the relationship between Unsolicited and Rating. The marginal impact of 
public disclosure is implicitly reflected in changing coefficient estimates. Figure 2 plots 
the estimated coefficients of the different explanatory variables of equation (17) along 
with their confidence interval against the corresponding definition of the High disclosure 
dummy.  
The coefficients of the first eight variables (LLP/Net interest revenue to Disclosure 
index) are close to those shown in Table 4, which is not surprising given that equations 
(1) and (17) are very similar. More interesting are the results for the coefficient of 
Unsolicited interacted with High disclosure and of Unsolicited interacted with (1 - High 
disclosure). I find that the coefficient of the former variable, δ1, is insignificant when 
High disclosure is equal to one for values of the disclosure index above the 67
th percentile 
of its sample distribution and equal to zero otherwise. I also find that the coefficient of 
the latter variable, δ2, is negative and significant irrespective of the definition of the High 
disclosure dummy. This means that the public disclosure hypothesis is validated when 
high disclosure banks are defined as the 32 percent (or less) of sample banks with the 
highest disclosure index.
19 In this case, unsolicited ratings of high disclosure banks are 
not statistically different from solicited ratings whereas unsolicited ratings of low 
                                                           
19 It is important to mention that the analysis carried out above also holds if the High disclosure 
dummy is defined using the percentiles of the world distribution of bank disclosure indexes instead 
of their sample distribution. The world distribution of bank disclosure indexes was obtained by 
calculating the disclosure index of 10,577 banks from Bankscope.    29
disclosure banks are lower than solicited ratings by one notch on average. The threshold 
above which the public disclosure hypothesis holds corresponds to a disclosure index 
equal to 47.4, meaning that banks which release at least 70 items (out of a possible 147) 
in Bankscope’s global detailed format do not receive lower unsolicited ratings.   
On the basis of Figure 2, I conclude that my results support the public disclosure 
hypothesis, which states that the difference in treatment between solicited and 
unsolicited ratings disappears when banks with an unsolicited rating release enough 
public information to compensate for the absence of private information. This finding is 
consistent with the fact that public disclosure gives issuers the benefit of the doubt when 
they choose not to request a rating (Golin, 2001). 
 
 
6  Conclusion and policy implications 
 
This paper empirically investigates whether there is a difference in treatment 
between solicited and unsolicited bank ratings and, if so, why. Using individual ratings of 
Asian banks, I find that Fitch assigns the same weight to rating determinants reflecting 
public information in the solicited and unsolicited groups. This result gives some 
credence to Fitch’s claim that the methodology for its unsolicited bank ratings is almost 
the same as for its solicited bank ratings. However, I also find that unsolicited bank 
ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones after controlling for rating determinants 
reflecting public information. The difference in treatment between both types of ratings 
is economically significant as it represents between 0.8 and 1.2 notches on a 1 to 9 rating 
scale.  
The existence of a difference in treatment between solicited and unsolicited ratings 
has already been documented for other credit rating agencies. Several explanations are 
consistent with it, including the fact that issuers with more favourable private 
information may request a rating or the fact that unsolicited ratings do not involve the 
disclosure of private information and, as a result, may be more conservative than 
solicited ones. In addition, many issuers also believe that credit rating agencies assign a 
lower unsolicited rating in order to persuade them to pay for a solicited rating. 
Improving on previous research which does not adequately or explicitly control for 
sample selection, this study uses a treatment effect model and an endogenous switching 
regression model to test whether banks with more favourable private information self-  30
select into the solicited group (“self-selection hypothesis”). To the best of my knowledge, 
this study is also the first one to test whether the difference in treatment between 
solicited and unsolicited ratings disappears when banks with an unsolicited rating release 
enough public information to compensate for the absence of private information (“public 
disclosure hypothesis”). The results of this paper reject the self-selection hypothesis but 
support the public disclosure hypothesis. 
The above-mentioned findings are interesting for several reasons. First, Fitch 
recently announced that it was about to assign unsolicited individual ratings to 150-200 
German insurance companies “in order to provide more comprehensive coverage in the 
European insurance sector to meet the growing demand” for its ratings. In contrast to 
traditional solicited insurance ratings, these ratings would be “generated solely using a 
statistical model that utilizes financial statement information” (Fitch, 2004c). Fitch’s 
announcement triggered an immediate reaction from the German Insurance Industry 
Association GDV, which expressed its deepest concerns and urged Fitch to refrain from 
publishing any unsolicited ratings unless the new rating methodology had been “fully 
disclosed and widely discussed with the German insurance industry and the general 
public” (GDV, 2004). GDV also stressed that Fitch’s decision constituted a serious 
offence to several provisions of the new IOSCO code of conduct for credit rating 
agencies. Fitch replied by clarifying some points underlying its methodology for 
unsolicited insurance ratings but decided to press ahead with the publication of these 
ratings (Fitch, 2005). This study indicates that some of the concerns voiced by GDV 
may be valid, as it shows the existence of a conservative bias in bank ratings which are 
primarily based on public information.  
Second, possible measures concerning credit rating agencies are currently being 
discussed at the European level. In particular, the European Commission is investigating 
the potential need to “disclose, or manage, unsolicited ratings” (European Commission, 
2004). Although the results of this study find no evidence of wrongdoing by credit rating 
agencies, they support additional measures designed to clarify the differences between 
solicited and unsolicited ratings. For instance, the mere addition by Fitch of the letter 
“s” (shadow) to its unsolicited bank ratings seems insufficient to mark their difference 
with ratings which are asked and paid for by issuers. It should therefore be required that 
the specific characteristics and the limitations of unsolicited bank ratings - including the 
conservative bias documented in this paper - are made completely transparent to the 
public.     31
Third, the New Basel Accord, which is due to be implemented by G-10 banks at the 
end of 2006, aims at increasing public disclosure by banks in order to ensure that market 
participants can better understand banks’ risk profile and the adequacy of their capital 
position. It is therefore necessary that financial institution managers understand the need 
for more disclosure and move in this direction on their own. This paper provides an 
incentive for bank managers to disclose information as it documents the impact of public 
disclosure on credit ratings, i.e. on the cost of borrowing, and on the relationship 
between soliciting a rating and the actual rating outcome. I show that public disclosure 
has not only a positive effect on individual ratings, but that it also eliminates the 
downward bias of unsolicited individual ratings.      
    Finally, it is worth stressing that the individual ratings used in this study are 
assigned to banks located in Asia. To some extent, this limits the relevance of my results 
in the European context. Given this caveat, the policy recommendations made above 
should be interpreted with care.  
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Table 1: Distribution of bank individual ratings by country (Asia) 
a 
Solicited Unsolicited  Total   Country  Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq.  Perc. 
 Azerbaijan   1   0   1   
 Bangladesh   1 (0.6) 5 (3.0) 6  (3.6) 
 China   1 (0.6) 15 (8.9) 16  (9.5) 
 Georgia   1   0   1   
 Hong Kong   8 (4.7) 10 (5.9) 18  (10.7) 
 India   4 (2.4) 28 (16.6)  32  (18.9) 
 Indonesia   10 (5.9) 2 (1.2)  12  (7.1) 
 Japan  31   0   31   
 Kazakhstan  6   0   6   
 Macau   2 (1.2) 1 (0.6) 3  (1.8) 
 Malaysia   7 (4.1) 4 (2.4)  11  (6.5) 
 Pakistan  0   4   4   
 Philippines   11 (6.5) 2 (1.2)  13  (7.7) 
 Singapore  6   0   6   
 South Korea   9 (5.3) 3 (1.8)  12  (7.1) 
 Sri Lanka  0   5   5   
 Taiwan  20 (11.8) 19 (11.2) 39  (23.1) 
 Thailand  10   0   10   
 Vietnam  1 (0.6) 6 (3.6) 7  (4.1) 
 Total   128   105   233   
 Sample countries 
b  74 (43.8) 95 (56.2)  169  (100) 
Note: 
a As of January 31, 2004 
 
b Countries with both solicited and unsolicited ratings (shown in italics) 





Table 2: Distribution of bank individual ratings by rating level (sample countries) 
Solicited Unsolicited  Total  Individual 
rating  Interpretation 
a  Freq. Perc. Freq. Perc. Freq.  Perc. 
   A  A very strong bank  -  -  - 
   A / B    1 (0.6)  1 (0.6)  2  (1.2) 
   B  A strong bank  2 (1.2)  0 (0.0)  2  (1.2) 
   B / C    11 (6.5)  3 (1.8)  14  (8.3) 
   C  An adequate bank  17 (10.1) 14 (8.3)  31  (18.3)
   C / D    14 (8.3)  11 (6.5)  25  (14.8)
   D  A bank that has weaknesses   20 (11.8) 20 (11.8)  40  (23.7)
   D / E    5 (3.0)  23 (13.6)  28  (16.6)
   E  A bank with serious problems 4 (2.4)  23 (13.6)  27  (16.0)
   Total    74 (43.8) 95 (56.2)  169  (100) 
Note: 
a See the Appendix for a detailed interpretation 
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Table 3: Comparison of banks characteristics in the solicited and unsolicited groups   
Solicited Unsolicited 
Variables  Mean   SD Obs Mean   SD  Obs  t-value
1. Risk management         
 Loan loss provisions/Net int. rev.  33.9 69.6 65 36.4 38.3  90  -0.30 
 Impaired loans/Gross loans  14.9 19.6 64 9.1 7.7  59   2.14* 
2. Funding and liquidity          
 Net loans/Total assets  48.4 20.5 74 52.6 13.5  95  -1.59 
 Liquid assets/Total deposits  47.7 71.5 70 31.9 15.7  86   1.99* 
3. Capitalisation          
 Total capital ratio  17.3 17.0 65 12.5 4.4  75   2.35* 
 Equity/Total assets  13.2 17.2 74 6.2 3.9  95   3.81**
4. Securitisation          
  ( n o n e )           
5. Earnings and performance          
 Return on assets  0.5 2.7 74 0.5 1.0  95  -0.11 
 Cost to income ratio  49.0 21.6 73 54.5 24.7  95  -1.51 
6. Market environment          
 Consolidated statement  62.2 48.8 74 44.2 49.9  95   2.34* 
 Unqualified statement  88.3 17.4 74 77.2 29.4  95   2.86**
 Commercial bank  77.0 42.4 74 94.7 22.4  95  -3.50**
 Non-banking credit institution  13.5 34.4 74 0.0 0.0  95   3.83**
 Sovereign rating long-term  12.9 3.7 71 12.8 3.1  89   0.07 
7. Diversification/franchise          
 Total deposits  15.3 27.4 65 26.5 76.3  95  -1.13 
 Market share (deposits)  5.6 6.5 62 5.4 10.4  94   0.11 
 Number of branches/Total assets  51.7 96.9 42 70.9 80.1  80  -1.17 
 Number of banks per 1,000,000 inh.  3.3 5.0 74 2.3 4.6  95   1.37 
8. Management and strategy          
 Number of directors and managers  19.3 10.0 52 21.8 13.0  79  -1.17 
9. Corporate governance          
 Corporate governance index  6.0 1.3 71 6.8 1.4  89  -3.93**
 Domestic shareholders  73.5 44.4 68 77.8 41.8  90  -0.62 
  Percentage  of  shares  owned  by:          
   Banks  33.8 41.7 73 23.4 38.2  90   1.66 
   Individuals/Families  4.3 14.3 73 0.4 1.7  90   2.59**
   Industrial companies  10.9 24.7 73 10.0 20.1  90   0.26 
   State/Public authority  9.1 24.3 73 28.3 40.3  90  -3.57**
 Number of subsidiaries maj. owned  7.0 7.7 59 3.2 3.9  78   3.77**
10. Public disclosure          
 Disclosure index  44.3 5.7 74 42.5 5.7  95  1.97* 
Note: 
 
See Table 1A for variables definition and unit. Statistics in the table include mean (Mean), 
standard deviation (SD) and number of observations (Obs) of each variable. The t-values in 
the last column refer to the t-statistics of the means between the solicited rating group and 
the unsolicited rating group; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   37
Table 4: Determinants of individual ratings (1) 
Dependent variable: Individual rating coded on a 9 (A) - 1 (E) scale 
  Ordinary least squares Instrumental variables
(1) (2) (1)  (2) Independent variables 
Constant  -0.713 -0.872 -1.733 -1.853 
  (0.47) (0.58) (0.97) (1.05) 
Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue  -0.012** -0.011* -0.011** -0.011* 
  (2.81) (2.60) (2.72) (2.50) 
Net loans/Total assets  0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.004 
  (0.21) (0.41) (0.17) (0.44) 
Equity/Total assets  0.042* 0.046* 0.065* 0.069* 
  (2.45) (2.14) (2.05) (2.03) 
Cost to income ratio  -0.022** -0.022** -0.019** -0.020** 
  (3.92) (4.04) (3.11) (3.25) 
Consolidated statement dummy  0.613** 0.672** 0.580** 0.658** 
  (2.89) (3.17) (2.72) (3.10) 
Log (total deposits)  -0.102 -0.059 -0.078 -0.045 
  (1.37) (0.75) (0.86) (0.49) 
Bank ownership dummy  0.737** 0.650** 0.724**  0.646* 
  (3.08) (2.63) (2.95) (2.56) 
Disclosure index  0.140** 0.140** 0.148** 0.154** 
  (7.26) (6.71) (6.60) (6.42) 
Solicited individual rating dummy  0.829** 1.208** 0.784** 1.199** 
  (3.83) (4.13) (3.49) (4.09) 
Unqualified statement dummy   -0.296  -0.451 
   (0.71)  (0.98) 
State ownership dummy   -0.202  -0.129 
   (0.83)  (0.52) 
Solicited dummy * Other rating dummy   -0.607   -0.644* 
   (1.94)  (2.09) 
Observations  148 148 148 148 
Adjusted R-squared  0.57 0.58 0.57 0.57 
Classification accuracy (%)       
   actual minus predicted rating = 0  34.5 27.7 37.8 31.1 
   actual minus predicted rating = -1 or 1  48.7 57.4 46.0 53.4 
   actual minus predicted rating ≥ -2 or 2  16.9 14.9 16.2 15.5 
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Table 5: Determinants of individual ratings (2) 
Dependent variable: Individual rating coded on a 9 (A) - 1 (E) scale 
  Ordinary least squares Instrumental variables
(1) (2) (1)  (2) Independent variables 
Constant  -0.713 0.382 -1.733 -4.888
  (0.47) (0.17) (0.97) (1.32) 
Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue -0.012** -0.014* -0.011** -0.014*
  (2.81) (2.15) (2.72) (2.12) 
Net loans/Total assets 0.002 -0.011 0.001 -0.007
  (0.21) (0.97) (0.17) (0.51) 
Equity/Total assets  0.042* 0.080* 0.065* 0.228*
  (2.45) (1.99) (2.05) (1.99) 
Cost to income ratio  -0.022** -0.020** -0.019** -0.006
  (3.92) (2.95) (3.11) (0.53) 
Consolidated statement dummy  0.613** 0.586* 0.580** 0.197
  (2.89) (1.97) (2.72) (0.49) 
Log (total deposits)  -0.102 -0.092 -0.078 0.079
  (1.37) (0.79) (0.86) (0.46) 
Bank ownership dummy  0.737** 0.605 0.724** 0.554
  (3.08) (1.78) (2.95) (1.62) 
Disclosure index  0.140** 0.121** 0.148** 0.141**
  (7.26) (5.17) (6.60) (3.61) 
Solicited individual rating dummy  0.829** -1.882 0.784** 7.126
  (3.83) (0.54) (3.49) (1.21) 
Solicited dummy * LLP/Net interest revenue  0.001  -0.001 
    (0.13)    (0.09) 
Solicited dummy * Net loans/Total assets 0.033*  0.035
   (2.14)  (1.79) 
Solicited dummy * Equity/Total assets   -0.059  -0.296 
   (1.31)  (1.86) 
Solicited dummy * Cost to income ratio   -0.004  -0.026 
   (0.36)  (1.41) 
Solicited dummy * Consolidated dummy   -0.180  0.062 
   (0.34)  (0.11) 
Solicited dummy * Log (total deposits)   0.044  -0.010 
   (0.22)  (0.03) 
Solicited dummy * Bank ownership dummy   0.089  0.145 
   (0.16)  (0.26) 
Solicited dummy * Disclosure index   0.022  -0.098 
   (0.44)  (0.98) 
Observations  148 148 148 148 
Adjusted R-squared  0.57 0.58 0.57 0.47 
Classification accuracy (%)       
   actual minus predicted rating = 0  34.5 34.5 37.8 29.7 
   actual minus predicted rating = -1 or 1  48.7 50.0 46.0 52.0 
   actual minus predicted rating ≥ -2 or 2  16.9 15.5 16.2 18.3 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 6: Treatment effect model 
Dependent variable (selection equation): Solicited individual rating dummy 
Dependent variable (outcome equation): Individual rating coded on a 9 (A) - 1 (E) scale 
 Two-step  Three-step 
Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Independent variables 
Constant  -0.139 -0.683 -0.970 -1.742 
  (0.08) (0.49) (0.38) (0.81) 
Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue  0.007 -0.011** 0.007  -0.011* 
  (1.69) (3.14) (1.53) (1.98) 
Net loans/Total assets  -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
  (0.12) (0.23) (0.14) (0.16) 
Equity/Total assets  0.010 0.043* 0.037  0.071 
  (0.40) (2.03) (0.77) (1.64) 
Cost to income ratio  0.001 -0.022** 0.004  -0.019* 
  (0.10) (4.63) (0.40) (2.13) 
Consolidated statement dummy  0.773** 0.645* 0.734** 0.655* 
  (2.99) (2.21) (2.60) (1.99) 
Log (total deposits)  -0.268* -0.111  -0.221  -0.094 
  (2.54) (1.15) (1.68) (0.85) 
Bank ownership dummy  -0.078 0.731** -0.070 0.711** 
  (0.26) (2.94) (0.17) (2.59) 
Disclosure index  0.074** 0.142**  0.069*  0.154** 
  (2.96) (5.68) (2.00) (4.35) 
Solicited long-term debt rating dummy  1.027**   0.965*   
  (2.80)  (1.99)  
Solicited individual rating dummy   0.718  0.509 
   (0.94)  (0.49) 
Hazard rate   0.071  0.227 
   (0.15)  (0.37) 
Observations  148 148 148 148 
Pseudo R-squared  0.19  0.19  
Classification accuracy (%) - Selection      
   correctly classified   68.9  66.2  
Adjusted R-squared   0.57  0.55 
Classification accuracy (%) - Outcome      
   actual minus predicted rating = 0   34.5  39.9 
   actual minus predicted rating = -1 or 1   46.6  36.5 
   actual minus predicted rating ≥ -2 or 2   18.9  23.7 
Notes: 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses for the two-step method; Bootstrapped t-statistics in 
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Table 7: Endogenous switching regression model 
Dependent variable: Individual rating coded on a 9 (A) - 1 (E) scale 
  Max. Likelihood  Max. Likelihood + IV 
Unsolicited Solicited Unsolicited Solicited  Independent variables 
Constant  0.403 -1.622 0.418 -2.305 
  (0.21) (0.63) (0.17) (0.61) 
Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue  -0.014* -0.013**  -0.014  -0.014 
  (2.04) (2.70) (1.54) (1.83) 
Net loans/Total assets  -0.011 0.022 -0.012 0.022 
  (1.08) (1.19) (1.13) (1.71) 
Equity/Total assets  0.082 0.022 0.056 0.047 
  (1.46) (0.59) (1.08) (0.90) 
Cost to income ratio  -0.019* -0.023* -0.020* -0.022* 
  (2.30) (2.28) (2.05) (2.40) 
Consolidated statement dummy  0.654 0.468  0.659*  0.277 
  (1.29) (0.94) (2.07) (0.52) 
Log (total deposits)  -0.105 -0.077 -0.171 0.181 
  (0.81) (0.30) (1.40) (0.81) 
Bank ownership dummy  0.604 0.675 0.467 0.737 
  (1.75) (1.38) (1.49) (1.37) 
Disclosure index  0.126** 0.152** 0.155**  0.082 
  (3.63) (2.59) (5.30) (1.02) 
Standard deviation (ε1) = σ1  1.086**  1.162**  
  (6.99)  (7.61)  
Correlation (ε1, u) = ρ1u  0.122  -0.113  
  (0.21)  (0.25)  
Standard deviation (ε2) = σ2   0.996**  0.956** 
   (8.63)  (8.25) 
Correlation (ε2, u) = ρ2u   -0.150  -0.084 
   (0.16)  (0.16) 
Observations  85 63 85 63 
Adjusted R-squared  0.57 0.37 0.59 0.36 
Classification accuracy (%)       
   actual minus predicted rating = 0  38.8 31.8 42.4 30.2 
   actual minus predicted rating = -1 or 1  49.4 47.6 45.9 50.8 
   actual minus predicted rating ≥ -2 or 2  11.8 20.6 11.8 19.1 
Notes:  Results of the selection equation are not reported 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses for the Maximum Likelihood estimation; Bootstrapped t-
statistics in parentheses for the Maximum Likelihood + IV estimation; * significant at 5%;  
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      Source:  Bankscope (updates 129.2 to 170.2) and Fitch Research   42
Figure 2:  Estimated coefficients and confidence intervals for the variables included in equation (17)  
 





50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile of the disclosure index
 






50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile of the disclosure index
 








50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile of the disclosure index
 






50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile of the disclosure index
 








50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile of the disclosure index
 






50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile of the disclosure index
 








50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile of the disclosure index
 







50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile of the disclosure index
 










50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile of the disclosure index
 







50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile of the disclosure index










Individual Ratings are assigned only to banks. These ratings, which are internationally 
comparable, attempt to assess how a bank would be viewed if it were entirely 
independent and could not rely on external support. These ratings are designed to assess 
a bank’s exposure to, appetite for, and management of risk, and thus represent our view 
on the likelihood that it would run into significant difficulties such that it would require 
support. The principal factors we analyze to evaluate the bank and determine these 
ratings include profitability and balance sheet integrity (including capitalization), 
franchise, management, operating environment, and prospects. Finally, consistency is an 
important consideration, as is a bank’s size (in terms of equity capital) and 
diversification (in terms of involvement in a variety of activities in different economic 




A  A very strong bank. Characteristics may include outstanding profitability and 
balance sheet integrity, franchise, management, operating environment or prospects. 
 
B  A strong bank. There are no major concerns regarding the bank. Characteristics 
may include strong profitability and balance sheet integrity, franchise, management, 
operating environment or prospects. 
 
C  An adequate bank, which, however, possesses one or more troublesome aspects. 
There may be some concerns regarding its profitability and balance sheet integrity, 
franchise, management, operating environment or prospects. 
 
D  A bank, which has weaknesses of internal and/or external origin. There are concerns 
regarding its profitability and balance sheet integrity, franchise, management, 
operating environment or prospects. Banks in emerging markets are necessarily 
faced with a greater number of potential deficiencies of external origin. 
 
E  A bank with very serious problems, which either requires or is likely to require 
external support. 
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Table 1A: Variables definition and sample descriptive statistics  
Variable  Definition  Obs Mean    SD  Min Max
1. Risk management         
 Loan loss provisions/Net int. rev.  100 * (Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue)  155 35.4 53.5 -75.9 312.9
 Impaired loans/Gross loans  100 * (Impaired loans/(Loans + Loan loss reserve))  123 12.1 15.4 0 97.3
2. Funding and liquidity         
 Net loans/Total assets  100 * (Loans/Total assets)   169 50.7 17.0 -0.1 91.4
 Liquid assets/Total deposits  100 * (Liquid assets/Customer and short-term funding)  156 39.0 49.7 0.7 471.3
3. Capitalisation         
 Total capital ratio  100 * ((Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/Risk-weighted assets)  140 14.7 12.2 -12.1 137.8
 Equity/Total assets  100 * (Equity/Total assets)  169 9.3 12.2 -20.2 84.0
4. Securitisation         
  ( n o n e )          
5. Earnings and performance         
 Return on assets  100 * (Net income/Total assets)  169 0.5 2.0 -11.0 7.2
 Cost to income ratio  100 * (Overheads/(Net Interest Revenue + Other Operating 
Income)) 
168 52.1 23.5 14.5 240.3
6. Market environment         
 Consolidated statement  100 if the bank’s statement is consolidated, 0 otherwise  169 52.1 50.1 0 100
  Unqualified  statement  100 if the bank’s statement has been audited and the 
accounts have been accepted by the auditors without any 
remark, 0 otherwise 
169 82.1 25.4 0 100
 Commercial bank  100 if commercial bank, 0 otherwise  169 87.0 33.7 0 100
 Non-banking credit institution  100 if non-banking credit institution, 0 otherwise  169 3.3 1.6 0 100
 Sovereign rating long-term 
a  Fitch’s sovereign foreign currency long-term rating coded on 
a 20 (AAA) to 1 (D) scale 
160 12.8 3.4 7 17
7. Diversification/franchise         
 Total deposits  Total deposits (in billion of US $)  160 22.0 61.4 0.0 506.0
 Market share (deposits)  100 * (Total deposits at bank j/Total banking deposits in 
the country of bank j) 
156 5.5 9.0 0.1 56.6
 Number of branches/Total assets  Number of branches/Total assets (in billion of US $)  122 64.3 86.3 1.4 460.1
 Number of banks per 1,000,000 inh.  Number of banks in country j/(Total population in country 
j/1,000,000)  
169 2.7 4.8 0.0 21  45
Table 1A ctd.  
Variable  Definition  Obs Mean    SD  Min Max
8. Management and strategy   
 Number of directors and managers  Number of directors and managers who are members of the 
supervisory board, the board of managing directors, the 
executive committee and/or the audit committee 
131 20.8 12.0 1 70
9. Corporate governance         
 Corporate governance index 
a  Country’s corporate governance index coded on a 10 (worst) 
to 0 (best) scale 
160 6.4 1.4 4.4 8.3
 Domestic shareholders  100  if  all  bank  shareholders are from the bank’s country, 
0 otherwise 
158 75.9 42.9 0 100
 Percentage of shares owned by:  Percentage of bank shares owned by:       
   Banks  163 28.1 40.0 0 100
   Individuals/Families  163 2.1 9.8 0 92
   Industrial companies  163 10.4 22.2 0 100
   State/Public authority 
  other banks (0 to 100) 
  individuals and families (0 to 100) 
  industrial companies (0 to 100) 
  State and public authority (0 to 100)   163 19.7 35.3 0 100
 Number of subsidiaries maj. owned  Number of bank and non bank subsidiaries majority owned 
by the bank  
137 4.8 6.1 0 42
10. Public disclosure         
 Disclosure index 






147∑   
where itemi is equal to 100 if available in the “global 
detailed” format of Bankscope, 0 otherwise. The 147 items in 
this format include asset items (54), liabilities items (43), 
income statement items (37) and note items (13)        
169 43.3 5.7 28.6 55.8
Notes:
a These variables are country-specific 
Source: All variables are from Bankscope except countries’ total population and the corporate governance index, which are from The World Bank 
and from Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Ltd., respectively 
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Table 2A: Determinants of individual ratings 
Dependent variable: Individual rating coded on a 9 (A) - 1 (E) scale 
  Ordinary least squares Ordered probit 
(1) (2) (1)  (2) Independent variables 
Constant  -0.713 -0.872  -  - 
  (0.47) (0.58)  - - 
Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue  -0.012** -0.011* -0.012**  -0.012** 
  (2.81) (2.60) (2.69) (2.61) 
Net loans/Total assets  0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.008 
  (0.21) (0.41) (0.19) (0.92) 
Equity/Total assets  0.042* 0.046* 0.037*  0.039 
  (2.45) (2.14) (2.38) (1.93) 
Cost to income ratio  -0.022** -0.022** -0.024** -0.024** 
  (3.92) (4.04) (3.90) (4.17) 
Consolidated statement dummy  0.613** 0.672** 0.591** 0.643** 
  (2.89) (3.17) (2.88) (3.10) 
Log (total deposits)  -0.102 -0.059 -0.138 -0.078 
  (1.37) (0.75) (1.76) (0.91) 
Bank ownership dummy  0.737** 0.650** 0.687**  0.579* 
  (3.08) (2.63) (3.24) (2.54) 
Disclosure index  0.140** 0.140** 0.149** 0.149** 
  (7.26) (6.71) (6.40) (6.13) 
Solicited individual rating dummy  0.829** 1.208** 0.848** 1.257** 
  (3.83) (4.13) (4.12) (4.44) 
Solicited dummy * Other rating dummy   -0.607   -0.655* 
   (1.94)  (2.18) 
Unqualified statement dummy   -0.296  -0.106 
   (0.71)  (0.23) 
State ownership dummy   -0.202  -0.358 
   (0.83)  (1.48) 
Observations  148 148 148 148 
Adjusted R-squared  0.57 0.58    
Pseudo R-squared     0.25  0.26 
Classification accuracy (%)       
   actual minus predicted rating = 0  34.5 27.7 39.9 38.5 
   actual minus predicted rating = -1 or 1  48.7 57.4 37.8 38.5 
   actual minus predicted rating ≥ -2 or 2  16.9 14.9 22.3 23.0 
Notes:  Cut points of the ordered probit model are not reported 
  Robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 